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In the history of international relations in the 20th century, two major 
attempts have been made to shape a new international order to supercede 
the traditional power game between nation states - a game usually referred 
to as the balance of power. Both the League of Nations, after the First 
World War, and the United Nations, following the Second World War, 
were conceived in a - mainly US-inspired - desire to replace the essential-
ly anarchic world of balance of power and of alliances by a higher and 
more centralised international order. Yet, while both attempts may have 
brought certain benefits, both failed in their central purpose. 
What follows is an attempt to show that in the diplomacy of the Second 
World War there existed a real - and in retrospect more realistic - alter-
native to the universalist experiment of the United Nations Organisation. 
It will also be my contention that the failure of the UN to contain and 
mitigate the burgeoning Cold War, and the resurgence of a balance of 
power in a hostile climate, may have served to prolong and aggravate the 
East-West conflict. Counter-factual history is a dangerous game. However, 
since one of the purposes of international history is to identify and 9hed 
light on elements of stability and instability in international systems in the 
20th century, it may be worth while to ponder the pitfalls of zealous 
internationalist reformism. 
Disregarding all the nuances and refinements close to the hearts of most 
historians, the 1941-1945 debate within the Grand Alliance on the postwar 
international order can be reduced to a fairly clear-cut contest .between 
what we may here for brevity's sake call universalism, on the one hand, 
and on the other the more regionalist system based on the balance of 
power and great power spheres of influence. The United States Secretary 
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of State Cordell Hull put it in a nutshell as he welcomed the 1943 Four-
Power Moscow Declaration proposing the idea of a "general international 
organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-
loving states':. This means, he said, "that there will no longer be n,~d for 
spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power,. or any' other of 
the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past; the nations 
strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interest. "2 Hull thus 
came near to portraying the contest between the two systems as one 
between good and evil, in which the good had now finally got the upper 
hand. 
However, the debate did not start in 1943, but two years earlier, during 
the. formative months of the Grand Alliance. The initial call for such a 
debate came in Stalin's letter to Churchill in the autumn of 1941 wherein 
he · blamed the disagreements between the two allies on the lack of a 
"defmite understanding ... concerning war aims and plans for the postwar 
organisation of peace."' And Stalin was also the first to introduce into 
the grea:t power debate some sort of blueprint for the ordering of postwar 
international affairs. He did this during his December 1941 conversations 
with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, when he put forward his 
proposals for what was essentially an agreed division of Europe into a 
Soviet and a British sphere of influence, for postwar security purposes.' 
The point of departure for. Stalin's proposals, put forward at their first 
meeting on 16 December 1941, was his proposed text for an Anglo-Soviet 
treaty on postwar European security, binding the parties . "to act in 
accordance with a mutual understanding in the. settlement of postwar 
questions connected with the organisation of peace and .security in 
2 United States Congress, Congressional Record, 18 November 1943, pp. 9678-79. 
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Europe", and to take "all necessary measures to render impossible a 
repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany."' 
Behind these innocuous formulae, to be included in a public treaty, lay a 
whole series of specific Soviet proposals which Stalin - as was his custom 
- wished to be embodied in a secret protocol. Several of the proposals 
required British acceptance of Soviet territorial expansion at the expense 
of Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, and Roumania. One suggested the 
dismemberment of Germany. Others concerned a series of frontier changes 
in South-Eastern Europe. But the most interesting one from our point of 
view was Stalin's scheme whereby each of the two powers would create 
its own regional network of alliances and military and naval bases in 
neighbouring countries, for mutual security against Germany. 
In particular, Stalin for his part wanted such protective alliances with 
Roumania and Finland. Poland was not mentioned, presumably either 
because Poland was an ally with a special significance for the British, or 
because Soviet security interests were for the time being taken care of by 
moving the whole of Poland westward. Britain, Stalin thought, might 
establish similar alliance arrangements with France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. A military alliance between the Soviet 
Union and Great Britain would form the superstructure of such a system 
for the future containment of Germany. 
Eden's immediate reaction to Stalin's proposals was cautious but generally 
favourable as regards arrangements for the containment of Germany. His 
main reservation concerned the attitude of the United States, which he 
thought ought to be part of the "superstructure". However, the negotiations 
soon centred on, and in the end became deadlocked over, Stalin's demands 
for the westward expansion of the borders of the Soviet Union. Eden 
would go no further than to promise to take up these questions with his 
own government as well as those of the Commonwealth and the United 
States after his return to London. 
The subsequent British consideration of the postwar European order makes 
it clear that the concept of regional alliances for the containment of 
Germany and the maintenance of peace and order in postwar Europe was 
neither alien nor distasteful to the British. In fact the Western European 
tier of such a system was already under discussion in the British Foreign 
Office; based on a scheme put forward by Norway's Foreign Minister 
• Sovjetsko-anglijskie otnosjenia ... Voi.I p.l86. 
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Trygve Lie. Lie.'s idea, elaborated during 1941, was for a mutual regional 
postwar security system for the countries bordering on the North Atlantic 
including the United States, directed against Germany, and with naval 
bases as an important component.• About a month after Eden's return 
from his meeting with Stalin this scheme was discussed at a meeting of 
senior officials of the British Foreign Office. A memorandum ·from this 
meeting concluded that the "conception of a security system founded upon 
such bases is one of the few ideas in regard to the post-war structure 
which seem to have practical value and to have some chance of general 
acceptance."' And the argument about the scheme's acceptability was 
clearly linked to Eden's report about Stalin's benevolence in regard to 
British bases in Denmark and Norway, although it was recognised that this 
benevolence was tied to a quid pro quo concerning Stalin's proposed 
arrangements along the western border of the Soviet Union. 
Further discussions in the British Foreigu Office and Cabinet during the 
winter and spring of 1942 showed a considerable willingness on the part 
of the British to meet some of Stalin's demands, in order to obtain a 
meaningful treaty on war and peace aims.' The difficulty was how to 
reconcile a secret agreement on border revisions and territori.al expansion 
with previous solemn pledges not to make any such deals. And here the 
main stumbling-block was the attitude of the United States, ~s expressed 
primarily by President Roosevelt. The end result, in the shape of the 
Anglo-Soviet treaty of 26 May, 1942, was as we know little.l:nore than a 
general statement of common war aims. The objections of the United 
States had thus been met. But the outcome hardly removed Stalin's 
suspicions about western attitudes to Soviet security requirements. 
As so often both before and after, Roosevelt's motives in blocking 
Britain's desire to meet some of Stalin's demands were of a mixed nature. 
While there is ample evidence that he favoured the right of the great 
powers to shape the world order without too much concern for .the self-
interests of the smaller powers, he expressed his opposition to a British-
• See e.g. O.Riste, "Norway's 'Atlantic Policy': The Genesis of North Atlantic. Defence 
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Soviet "deal" in terms of the lofty principles of the Atlantic Charter and 
the United Nations Declaration, professing aversion against secret treaties 
and territorial arrangements over the heads of the inhabitants concerned. 
Moreover, his consciousness of the rising power of the United States 
strengthened his personal determination to play a leading part in re-
ordering the postwar world through direct dealings with Stalin! 
The outlines of Roosevelt's proposed international order evidently began 
to form during those early months of 1942. As explained to Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov in June 1942, it conformed to a universalist 
conception in its insistence on the great powers acting jointly as the 
world's "policemen". This idea of joint action and responsibility, when 
coupled with Roosevelt's schemes for internationalisation and "trusteeship", 
clearly implied a rejection of more or less exclusive spheres of interest for 
each great power. To that extent Roosevelt's approach pointed in the 
opposite direction from the order envisaged by Stalin and - to some extent 
- the British. This was also admitted in a magazine article, inspired by 
Roosevelt but written by one of his cronies, which appeared in the spring 
of 1943. Entitled "Roosevelt's World Blueprint", this article made it clear 
that unless Stalin was willing to cooperate in such a "political society of 
nations" the. world would be "driven back on a balance-of-power system."'0 
On the other hand, Roosevelt's projected great power condominium was 
far removed from the principle of the "sovereign equality of all peace-
loving states" later re-established as a necessary concomitant of collec-
tive security. This principle, which represented a further step in the 
universalist direction, seems to have made its first appearance in draft 
agreements prepared by the American State Department in the early 
summer of 1943." And as we have seen, it then found its way into the 
Four-Power Moscow Declaration a few months later. 
By the end of 1943, therefore, the Grand Alliance appeared to be on 
course away from a "spheres of influence" approach and towards a 
universalist order. Yet at the same time both Roosevelt and Churchill 
' J.L.Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (Colum-
bia University Press, 1972) p.15. 
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managed to give Stalin the impression that there was no necessary conflict 
between this new international order and his expectation of a Soviet sphere 
of influence in Eastern Europe. Sooner or later this dualism would have 
to come into the open, unless a way could be found to create a workable 
compromise between the underlying concepts of universalism and 
regionalism. 
It fell to the British Foreign Office to attempt to reconcile the two 
approaches. Foreshadowed in their "Four Power Plan" at the end of 1942, 
the compromise suggested in the "United Nations Plan for Organising 
Peace" in the summer of 1943 was embodied in the following sentence: 
"Generally speaking, tendencies towards regional groupings should be 
encouraged, subject always to the principle thatno one World Power by 
itself should be given the task of maintaining order in any particular 
region. "'2 On that basis, the British foresaw regional defence systems for 
security against Germany and Japan in which all the great powers would 
participate. A "Council of Europe" was also envisaged on which all 
European states should be represented, "including the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union", but also "with the addition, it is to be hoped, of the 
United States."'' 
Britain's views on European security were most succinctly set forth in the 
earlier "Four Power Plan", in the following paragraph: 
In Europe, which is so closely knit together that it must for our purposes 
always be viewed and treated as one unit or region, the primary 
responsibility should fall generally on Great Britain and the Soviet Union, 
and this not only for geographical reasons but by virtue of the Anglo-
Soviet Treaty, which binds these two Powers "to take all the measures in 
their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation 
of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of 
aggression in Europe." This, however, need not preclude arrangements 
being made by Great Britain in Western Europe and by the Soviet 
Government in Eastern Europe in order to control as far as possible the 
policies of the local powers ... 14 
" Woodward, op.cit., Vol. V (London 1976) p.59. 
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The striking similarity between these ideas and those that lay at the base 
of Stalin's proposals to Eden in December 1941 suggests that a postwar 
order on those lines might have stood a chance of preempting the 
subsequent antagonistic division of Europe. The British Foreign Office in 
fact sought to resurrect the regional approach in their preparatory work for 
the United Nations Organisation, and succeeded in the autumn of 1944 in 
securing an opening for regional security associations in the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals. In a subsequent memorandum to Churchill, Foreign 
Secretary Eden referred to his December 1941 conversations with Stalin, 
and stated his conviction that Stalin would not oppose "the creation of a 
special regional association in Western Europe provided this were an 
integral part of the general system of world security, under the control of 
the World Organisation, and that it were made perfectly clear that it was 
directed against a resurgence of Germany."" And in an attached document, 
the Foreign Office asserted their belief in the compatibility of a regional 
approach to European security with the Anglo-Soviet Treaty: 
The Anglo-Soviet Treaty lies at the base of our whole European policy, 
and we should try to reinforce it by all means in our power. The 
formation of some western European security system would, however, 
reinforce rather than detract from the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, more especially 
if the Russians, with our approval, constructed some similar security 
system in Eastern Europe - and they will almost certainly do so whether 
we approve it or not." 
As regards the policy of the Soviet Union, it has been suggested that 
Stalin's statement on 21 April 1945, on the occasion of the signing of the 
Soviet-Polish Treaty, should be interpreted as signalling his continued faith 
in a dual but linked European alliance system directed against a resump-
tion of German aggression. 17 But by then time was running out for a 
regional approach based on mutual understanding. Soviet suspicion of the 
motives behind Western interest in political developments in Eastern 
Europe led to measures which pointed in the direction of a sphere of 
influence where Soviet interests would be not only predominant but 
exclusive. 
" Public Record Office, London: PREM 4/30/8, Eden to Churchill 29 November 1944. 
16 lbid., Annex A: "Western Europe". 
17 See A.Resis, "Spheres of Influence in Soviet Wartime Diplomacy", in Journal of 
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In the United States, in the meantime, there seemed no turning back from 
the position that "postwar security could oe achieved only through a 
fundamental restructuring of the international order", with "a new 
international organisation to keep the peace" as its mainstay.'" The few 
who advocated a spheres of influence approach, like George Kennan and 
Waiter Lippmann, were lone voices crying in> the wilderness. At the end 
of January 1945, Kennan wrote to his friend and fellow Russian expert 
Charles Bohlen: "Why could we not make a decent and definite 
compromise ... - divide Europe frankly into spheres of influence - keep 
ourselves out of the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours?" 
But Bohlen, no doubt reflecting the consensus of the State Department, 
dismissed the idea as "utterly impossible" - "Foreign policy like that 
cannot be made in a democracy."'" It is ironic to note, as John Gaddis 
has done, that by 1949 the positions of the two diplomats had been 
reversed. 
As it turned out, the world in 1945 embarked on the experiment of 
operating a fundamentally restructured international order, only to find 
itself after a few years faced with a Europe divided into two spheres of 
influence. Moreover, having been constructed in mutual adversity instead 
of on a basis of mutual understanding or at least acceptance, the two 
spheres were adamantly exclusive in character. It seems worth posing the 
question of whether the Cold War in Europe might not have been avoided 
if the sequence of the two approaches to a postwar order had been 
reversed - if gradual reform of the international order had preceded the 
attempt at a fundamental restructuring of the same. While the universalist 
principle which inspired the UN concept was a laudable one, it overlooked 
the fact that in a world dominated by the facts of power, security was a 
sine qua non. As George Kennan among others saw it, a basic measure 
of security had to come first: "No set of ideals could survive anarchy, or 
even chronic insecurity; certain minimal standards of stability had to be 
established before principles could be put into effect. nw 
The reasons commonly given as to why such a "spheres of influence" 
approach, by common consent and on a "non-exclusive" basis, was beyond 
" JL.Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford University Press 1982) p.56. 
" J .L.Gaddis, "The United States and the Question of a Sphere of Influence in Europe, 
1945-1949", in O.Riste (ed.) Western Security: The Formative Years (Norwegian 
University Press, 1985) p.60. 
"' J.L.Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.32. 
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the realms of possibility as the Second World War drew to an end, are 
hardly conclusive. As regards its being unacceptable to American opinion, 
this is an assumption which was never tested. The problem was rather, as 
John Gaddis has noted, that "by failing to prepare the American people for 
Stalin's demands in Eastern Europe, Roosevelt inadvertently undermined 
the domestic consensus necessary for his postwar policy of cooperation 
with the Soviet Union." 21 
The other assumption - that the smaller powers would never have accepted 
the great power preponderance which even a modified spheres of influence 
appl"()ach implied - is equally unproven. The Norwegian Government, for 
one, clearly stated its belief in a regional security order for Europe 
combined with an overriding "entente" between the Western powers and 
the Soviet Union.'2 
Historians know better than most that the "lessons of history" are an 
elusive commodity. But in reviewing the transition from the Second World 
War to the Cold War, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a gradual 
reform of the international order - a reform in which the safeguarding of 
basic security concerns by traditional balance-of-power means could be 
combined with attempts at building a superstructure of mutual great power 
understanding - would have stood a better chance of averting East-West 
antagonism than the grandiose universalist experiment which came into 
being at San Francisco in 1945. 
The frailty of that experiment soon became apparent. What followed was 
the rapid construction of a new European balance of power, created and 
nurtured by antagonism. The consequence was a rigid division of Europe. 
Not until the late 1960s did we see the beginnings of a process of detente, 
marked by such initiatives as Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik", followed by the 
1972 "Statement of Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations" in which the 
two super-powers indicated their mutual disavowal of the concept of 
exclusive spheres of influence. Then, from 1975 onwards, the so-called 
21 JL.Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, p.134. 
22 See e.g. my article "Norway's Atlantic Policy" in A. de Staercke and Others, NATO' s 
Anxious Birth (C.Hurst, London 1985) pp.l9-29. 
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Helsinki or CSCE process took the lead, by both acknowledging the status 
quo and pointing to ways in which the rigidity of the division might be 
reduced: through confidence and security building measures; through the 
erosion of political and economic barriers between Eastern and Western 
Europe; and through the promotion of human rights and easier contact and 
intercourse across boundaries. 
While disarmament and arms control, both globally and in Europe, has 
tended to grab the attention of the mass media, our historical perspective 
should serve to demonstrate that a detente process such as that started in 
Helsinki has to be an integrated process. Just as the arms build-up of the 
1950s reflected certain political facts, so disarmament and arms control 
depends for its progress on a measure of political detente. And postwar 
experiences suggest that political detente will prove ephemeral unless 
consolidated through real cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, 
and humanitarian fields. The revolutionary developments in the countries 
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have already laid the foundations 
of a. political·East·West detente. The challenge now confronting us is to 
develop an institutional superstructure for regional security and economic 
cooperation. CSCE, NATO - through its North Atlantic Cooperation 
<l:ouncil, and the EC could all have important functions to perform in that 
process. 
Even more significant, however, is the postwar experience that inter-
national peace and security cannot be built on panaceas. While the 
idealism of universal collective security or "world government" may be 
admirable, a balance of power system backed by the cautious diplomacy 
of the CSCE process has shown itself more practicable .. And there exists 
as yet no tested alternative to regional alliances as security guarantees in 
a' basically anarchic world. 
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